

that the Father's message is the *Father's* use of language, not a human's use of language. Does "is true" (with regard to linguistic assertions) mean one thing for God and a radically different thing for us? Van Til's "no identity-no coincidence" doctrine entails precisely that—that there is absolutely *no* semantic coincidence between divine and human minds with regard to our understanding of what it *means* to regard an assertion *as true*. I submit that this is patently absurd, because if the doctrine were true (*analogically* true on Van Til's reckoning), all prospects of communication between God and man would be gone.

I conclude the matter about the meaning of truth discernment by returning once more to II Peter 1:16-18. *Why* does Peter recount the incident of Jesus's transfiguration on the mountaintop and the Father's identification of *this* Jesus as his beloved Son? Peter tells us why, and I cannot do better than to let Peter speak for himself:

We did not follow cleverly invented stories when we told you about the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were *eyewitnesses* of his majesty. For he received honor and glory from God the Father when the voice came to him from the Majestic Glory, saying, "This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well pleased." We ourselves *heard* this voice that came from heaven when we were with him on the sacred mountain. [NIV]

Whatever else we may draw from Peter's testimony, we must regard it as an *epistemological* reassurance—a reassurance that Peter's witness to Christ satisfies the discernment of truth conditions, a discernment grounded in *eyewitness experience*. A "cleverly invented story" often succeeds in reference and coherent meaning, but that meaning is not *true of* what has been referred to. A clever but false story does not map the reality it may seem to map. And Peter chose an utterly strategic incident involving his own firsthand experience of the *Father's* verbally explicit identification of his Son. Thus has Peter drawn a *razor sharp line* (no "analogical" qualification here) between fiction and fact, between credible fable and real life event.

And here I repeat a point previously made, this time from a slightly different angle: our present concern does not have to do with *justifying* a truth-value assignment to a statement; it has to do, rather, with *what it*