agent (personhood requires this), then Van Til's analogicity/univocity distinction cannot be applied to Jesus."

[It has always been vital to historic Christianity to hold that although Jesus is both fully God and fully man, he is one person. Nestorianism taught, roughly, that Christ was two persons. Docetism, on the other hand, taught that Jesus's humanity was only apparent (making him divine only) and so his manlike qualities and especially his sufferings were illusory. Historic Christianity wisely rejected both Nestorianism and Docetism. And so, in fact, does Van Til in his strictly theological frame of mind. What Linus is saying, apparently, is that Van Til-were he to think it through—has a dilemma going at the heart of his own Christology. The 'no coincidence' doctrine coupled with the 'analogicity' doctrine seem to require either a Nestorian or a Docetic epistemology for the historical Jesus. Either of these, however, would be abhorrent to Van Til's biblical faith, for in that case, residing in the mind(s) of the historical Jesus were two incommensurable ways of structuring knowledge neither of which has points of coincidence with the other. Something must give.]

"It gets worse," Linus went on. "Given Van Til's doctrine of the radical otherness of God's knowledge, it follows that we are systematically removed from any epistemic gold standard, and that, Charles, spells relativism for you. Maybe I can illustrate the point this way:

"In 1971 Nixon floated the dollar on the sea of world economy, and so its international monetary value is *relativized to* (made dependent on) the fluctuations of that economy. Van Til floated knowledge claims, in effect, on the sea of presuppositional currencies (of which there are many), and strictly speaking, the truth-value of a presupposition is *relativized* to the system in which it occurs. Maybe a better way to put it, though Van Til would not, is that truth itself is *system relative*. There can be no *external test* of any system. And it's no good saying that the Christian's presuppositions are secured to God by an analogical tether. Logically speaking, some version of that move is available to any system with a declared absolute and transcendent deity. Any system that uses it, however, would be making an equally lame set of claims. Analogicity, to change metaphors, cannot serve as an epistemic *anchor* since, on Van Tillian