

sensory experience as the basis of knowledge.

endemic: native to; finding its natural home in . . .

entailment (logical): the deductive logical relation that holds if, and only if, it would be impossible for the conclusion of an argument to be false when its premises are (all) true. We often use the word "entailment" colloquially to mean "involve". *Logical* entailment is a far more precise and powerful connection than that. The entailment relation, moreover, is utterly truth-conserving; entailment, that is, is exclusively analytic and secures *only* what is already implicit in the premises. When the premises are (all) true, truth in the conclusion is guaranteed. When a premise (even a *single* premise) is false, the guarantee is gone. Contrast "entailed by" with "supported by". The latter is a characteristic of good inductive arguments.

epistemic: having to do with the activity of perceiving, believing, and knowing. Contrast with "epistemological" whose meaning, roughly, is "pertaining to theory of knowledge and issues arising within epistemology."

exemplar: a term of convenience for the primary *analogate* in the kind of analogy pertinent to theology.

epistemic background noise: metaphor to stress the necessity of an experienced *causal order* against which *miracle* is set off in relief. Also, a metaphor to indicate data that have special or striking salience over against a mundane background of what usually happens.

epistemic gold standard: the idea of a standard measure of all knowledge (and truth). Opposed to relativism.

epistemology: theory of knowledge. Attempts to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an individual can be said to *know* that something is the case. By contrast, *metaphysics* is theorizing about the character of what there is and the essential conceptual categories that are required to do this. A metaphysics of knowledge, for example, might involve a *characterization* of the *status* of knowledge. Thus in a metaphysics of knowledge one might want to inquire whether all knowledge is *propositional*, or whether some knowledge is *gestaltic*. One might also (as in the case of Van Til) inquire into the nature of the contrast between