

Abd ul Hamid had prepared the field of national sentiment to receive favourably the political gospel of the new nationalism.

Yet it must not be supposed that the devotion of the masses to Islam, as a religion, had been consciously weakened. They had ceased merely to feel acutely the contradiction between a Western legal code and the Mohammedan system of thought. That such a contradiction existed, and that this contradiction was fundamental, many of the educated leaders of the Young Turk movement were well aware. They knew also that this contradiction would be greatly intensified by many of the new measures they proposed to enforce. They accordingly employed all the tactics of a most anxious diplomacy to conceal from the masses the full significance of many of the measures proposed by the new government. We may take as an example such a change as the enrollment of a large non-Moslem element in the army. This change severed the army effectually from all relation to religious propaganda. It made the conception of a holy war henceforth forever impossible. Militant Islam is thus confronted with the necessity of employing new and moral, or at least social, instrumentalities for the maintenance of its dominant position in the nation. The Young Turk measures met with the bitterest opposition from that portion of the religious leaders, who had the insight to appreciate the far-reaching changes which the new tendencies would inevitably bring on Islam. Ecclesiastical orthodoxy had already, under Abd ul Hamid, been compelled to bear in silence a most damaging blow to its influence. For the ill-used representatives of orthodoxy, the political freedom proclaimed by the new régime suggested liberty to inaugurate a campaign for the restoration of the long dethroned Sheriat. All over the empire there were devout Moslems who naturally asked