[4] A Closer Look at "No Identity-No Coincidence"

If the absurdity doesn't quite leap out at you, maybe this will help. For brevity, call the proposition "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh" J. Now if we know that-J truly, which is to say that we know analogically that-J, we must also say, in accordance with Van Til's "no identity-no coincidence" doctrine, that J cannot express a content that is identical to a content in God's mind. But our commitment to J cannot count as knowing truly for Van Til unless there is in God's mind a content that is infinitely qualified by his omniscience, and to which our J is related by analogy. So far so good. Let us call the content in God's mind J' (J-prime); and now to summarize the main point in our symbolism, *there is no identity of content* between J and J'. Keep in mind that the *only* thing we know about J' is that *if* there is a J' it is systematically non-coincident *in content* with our J (but that our J is nevertheless somehow analogical of J').

But now notice the "if". Since we are incapable of ever entertaining J' (God's knowledge), we have to say that J' is systematically elusive and therefore radically unavailable for helping us to discern that our J is analogical of anything at all. J' is for the human intellect merely a hypothetical place holder expressing we know not what. It is hypothetical because our sole basis for positing it is (1) we find ourselves believing that-J and (2) Van Til's speculative theory requires that if we truly know that-J, J must be analogically anchored by J'. Were J to be false, there would of course be no divine conception "J". And it is a mere place holder because given the two radically different knowledge modalities (divine and human) there is no way in principle that J' could ever be rendered as a content that is comprehensible to man. We are confined, that is, to employ J' as a mere cipher symbolizing we know not what. But above all, since the content of J' is not conceivable by the human mind, J' cannot help us to come to a knowledge of J nor is there a way to enrich our understanding of J by somehow attending to J'.

It is perhaps distracting to use the proposition that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, so let me add that Van Til's is a *general* theory of knowledge and we could substitute for 'p' any proposition at all ('This rose is red', for example). And for any proposition at all, analogicity as a