ball in the park. There are, of course, other possibilities—some of them farfetched: the children may be at the corner grocery, or they may have hitchhiked to a rock concert thirty miles away in the next town, or (dread) they might even have fallen victim to an alien abduction. The list can be extended indefinitely. How do you proceed to determine their whereabouts?

Well, you locate them the old fashioned way: you go looking for them. Check the backyard. Check the park. And so on. What you do not do is presuppose where they are. You do not engage in the following train of thought: "Truly to know where the children are is analogically to know God's infinitely qualified space-time coordinates for them; therefore I just know that . . ." There is simply no heuristic value for locating children by means of such vacuous reasoning. Instead, as I say, you go looking. Analogicity can play absolutely no criterial role here. That is to say, determining analogicity for one of the possible locations is methodologically irrelevant. It is also methodologically impossible!

(... that's right, Lucy; Van Til seems to confuse epistemology with metaphysics, but we need to explain this better. See if this helps . . .)

After finding the children by means of looking for them, you might, as a good Van Tillian, declare your newfound knowledge of their whereabouts to be analogical of God's knowledge of their whereabouts. In so doing you would be confessing, in a manner of speaking, an absolute dependency of your knowledge of the children's whereabouts upon God's comprehensively qualified knowledge of their whereabouts. But there's a wee problem here, isn't there? You can't establish analogicity in advance of actually finding them, can you? You have to find the children before any putative knowledge of a location for them can be baptized as analogical of God's knowledge of that location! Which means, of course, that how you find out the children's whereabouts is independent of determining the analogical status of that knowledge! So first you determine where the children are, and only then might you indulge in speculating about the metaphysical character of the knowledge you have thus acquired.

What we have seen is that the *perceptual competence* that gives rise to your cognitive success (locating the children) can make no use of Van Til's characterization of human knowledge. Pagans, moreover, can locate *their* children with the same pinpoint accuracy as Christian believers.